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ABSTRACT
Shen, Yan. MA. The University of Memphis. August, 2014. Social Capital,
Political Capital, and Organizational Innovations in Chinese Firms. Major Professor:
Junmin Wang.

The current literature on economic sociology and organizational studies
demonstrates the positive role of entrepreneurs’ social capital in enhancing firm
performance. However, it offers limited knowledge about how entrepreneurs’ social
capital is mediated and shaped by the institutional contexts where they go about their
business activities. By analyzing the 2003 World Bank Investment Climate Survey
dataset, I examine how entrepreneurs’ social and political capital, separately and jointly,
shape firm outcomes in China. I find that entrepreneurs’ social capital has positive effects
on firms’ innovativeness. Although a firm’s impersonal political capital is found to have
positive effects on firm innovativeness, entrepreneurs’ personal political capital does not
play a positive role on firms’ innovativeness. These findings suggest Chinese firms may
benefit from investments in social capital and impersonal political capital, but
investments in personal political capital may not matter given the increasing
modernization and institutionalization of the China’s nascent market.
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INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation is a driving force for economic development and
economic growth for both developed and developing countries. At the firm level
technological innovation that has a promising potential in creating competitive
advantages for the firm in the market can greatly influence a firm’s financial performance
and even determine its survival (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Zielger 1992). Entrepreneurs
as the firm’s owners or top managers have been widely-regarded in the current literature
on organizational studies and specially entrepreneurship studies as a group of important
promoters of technological innovation for two main reasons. First, entrepreneurs have a
relatively higher level of human capital as characterized by their knowledge through
education and working experience. The positive relationship between human capital and
entrepreneurial activities including innovative activities is evident at the firm level
(Barney 1991; Dakhli and De Clercq 2004; Ganotakis 2012; Gimeno et al. 1997; Laursen
2002; Lopez-Cabrales, Valle and Herrero 2006). Second, entrepreneurs have acquired
privileges thanks to their easier access to external, valuable resources such as
information, knowledge, finance as well as favorable policies regarding outside
institutional environments. Thus, entrepreneurs’ social capital contributes to the firm’s
innovative activities and its competitive advantage (Allen 1977; Shan et al. 2010; Zheng
2010).
However, the current literature offers limited knowledge about how
entrepreneurs’ social capital is mediated and shaped by the institutional contexts where
they go about their business activities. In particular, we have insufficient knowledge of
how entrepreneurs’ political capital affects firms’ innovation activities. A number of
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studies show how political ties with government officials help secure preferential
treatments for the firms and help entrepreneurs “get things done” more easily (Liu 2003;
Nee and Cooper 2010; Peng and Luo 2000; Zhang and Zhang 2005; Zhou 2009). In
analyzing the state’s role in affecting technology transfer associated with foreign
investments, Wang (2012) demonstrates the dual role of the Chinese government in
affecting local firms’ innovative abilities; whereas the government plays a positive role in
channeling foreign technology to Chinese firms, its intervention into firm governance has
negative effects on firm’s technological performance. These studies suggest that it is
necessary to carefully investigate how the role of entrepreneurship in influencing firms’
innovation performance is mediated and shaped by the political-economic contexts where
entrepreneurs go about their business.
My thesis brings an economic-sociological perspective to study entrepreneurship
and to examine how entrepreneurs’ social capital and political capital have shaped the
firm’s innovation performance in contemporary China. My empirical analysis is based on
a nationally representative dataset from the 2003 World Bank Investment Climate Survey
(WBICS) conducted in China. The survey collected data on empirical indicators of
Chinese companies’ firm-level economic activities including various innovations and
entrepreneurs (CEOs)’ characteristics as well as the state’s different actions in firm-level
economic activities, and thus this dataset contains necessary information for my empirical
analysis. The results show that social capital at the firm level has statistically significant,
positive effects on firms’ innovation performance. However, the role of political capital
in affecting firm innovativeness is mixed and more complicated. I find that one type of
political capital, e.g. “impersonal political capital,” referring to state assistance at the firm
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level, contributes to firm innovativeness, but entrepreneurs’ personal political capital
remains inconclusive in affecting firms’ innovation performance.
My thesis is comprised of the following four sections. First, I explain the
background of this empirical study and particularly the development of entrepreneurs –
that mainly refer to those in the private sector – in contemporary China. Second, I review
the current literature and discuss relevant theories, and building on these discussions I
develop my hypotheses in this study. Third, I discuss the issues of data, measures and
methods of data analysis as well as the results of statistical analyses. In the last section, I
discuss the theoretical and empirical contributions of my thesis to the current literature
and the implications for future study on this subject.

CHINA’S MARKET-ORIENTED REFORM AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURS
Since 1978, China’s market-oriented economic reforms have transformed the
Chinese political economy. Over the past 30 years, China’s Gross Domestic Productivity
(GDP) growth rates average around 10%. Nowadays, China’s economy is the world’s
second largest economy by nominal GDP and by purchasing power parity, only behind
the United States. Figures 1 and 2 show China’s annual GDP and annual GDP growth
rate respectively. China’s annual GDP has increased from 61.4 billion U.S. dollars in
1961 to 8,230 billion U.S. dollars in 2013. Alongside rapid economic growth, China’s
revolutionary economic reform era has brought about several fundamental institutional
changes. First, the previous command economy has gradually diminished and given way
to the market economy (Naughton 1999). Second, the Chinese economy has gradually
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shifted its economic center from rural agricultural activities to urban industrial activities,
although about 50% of Chinese people are today still identified as rural residents
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Figure 1. China’s Annual GDP, 1961-2013
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Figure 2. China’s Annual GDP Growth Rate, 1978-2012

Another significant institutional change – the rise of the private sector – started in
China in the late 1970s and has boomed since the mid-1990s. With the rise of private
sector, entrepreneurs have emerged and gradually found their way to the center stage of
Chinese economy. Under the prior system of a command economy, state and collective
ownerships were the predominant types of ownership; private ownership and
entrepreneurs did not exist. Since the economic reform began in 1978, development of
the private sector has undergone three major phases. During the first developmental
phase, roughly 1978 to 1984, the private sector was mainly comprised of small family or
household enterprises (getihu), which according to the then Chinese enterprise laws and

5

regulations were able to have no more than eight employers. The private sector at that
time was merely used as an experiment to see how private ownership can work out in the
context of China, and it only existed in places where large state-owned enterprises had no
role in it. At the same time, a small group of entrepreneurs made their debut as the
owners of small family or household enterprises. During the second developmental
phase, ranging from 1984 to 1992, private enterprises (siying qiye) were officially
sanctioned in 1988 as the size of private firms continued to grow. However, even though
the state issued a variety of official laws and regulations to facilitate and regulate the
development of new economic institutions and particularly newly-established markets,
private firms faced a number of political interventions and political uncertainties, such as
the Tiananmen Square protests of 19891. Therefore, during this period, private
entrepreneurs tended to build alliances with local governments, government officials and
state-owned enterprises to seek opportunities, external resources and other favorable
treatments. For private entrepreneurs, one way to gain political protection was to register
their firms as collective enterprises although these firms were still run as private
enterprises. Such firms were as a matter of fact “fake collectives” or private enterprises
with a “red” hat (Dickson 2003; Walter, and Fraser 2011).

1

The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were also known as Tiananmen Square
massacre, which exposed deep splits within China’s leadership. The incident was a series of
demonstrations in and near Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, beginning on April 15th, 1989
and lasting for seven weeks. The student-led protests were triggered by the death of Yaobang Hu,
a Party official who was deposed after losing a power struggle with hardliners over the direction
of political and economic reform. The protests were forcibly suppressed by the hardliners who
cleared the square with military troops and tanks and declared martial law in May. Following the
conflict, the government conducted widespread arrests of protesters and their supporters,
suppressed other protests in China, and strictly restrained the coverage of this incident.
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Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 19922 ultimately generated a more flexible and
freer social and political environment for the development of private sector (McNally,
Guo and Hu 2007). Figures 3 and 4 show that the number of private firms increased from
140,000 in 1992 to 238,000 in 1993, a rapid growth rate of 90.39%. The issue and
implementation of Chinese Company Law in 1994 established foundations and conditions
for private firms to develop alongside state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises.
McNally et al. (2007: 3) state that “as limited liability corporations, private firms could
acquire a stronger organizational identity with respect to their political and social
environment. In fact, many of the ‘fake collectives’ opted to openly convert to private
limited liability companies.” In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government initiated new
policies of “grabbing the big and letting go of the small” (zhuanda fangxiao) and of
“transformation” (gaizhi) in state-owned enterprises. Such policies provided
entrepreneurs with opportunities to purchase shares in the state-owned enterprises. By the
end of 1998, the share of GDP contributed by Chinese private firms reached 33% (Pan
2001). During the period from 1991 to 1997, the annual growth rates of private firms,
employees and output value are respectively 41%, 41% and 71%. The majority of small
state firms owned by county-level governments or below was privatized by 2001. China’s
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 continued to enhance the
recognition of the social and political identity of private sectors in China. A policy
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Deng Xiaoping was one of the first generation of Chinese Communist Party leaders. He
became China’s paramount leader in 1976 and implemented Chinese economic reforms in 1978,
and was officially recognized as “the chief architect of China’s economic reforms and China’s
socialist modernization.” In the spring of 1992, Deng made the famous southern tour to visit
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai and reassert his economic agenda. During the tour, he made
talks to criticize those who held doubts on the reform and open-up policy and emphasize the
importance of economic development. Deng’s talks helped bring China’s economic reform back
on track.
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statement issued in 2003 further acknowledged that the establishment of a modern system
of property rights is significant for the development of private sectors (Kwan 2003).
Accordingly, in 2004 an amendment of the Chinese constitution legalized property rights,
stating that “private property obtained legally shall not be violated” (Buckley 2004).
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Figure 3. Growth Rate of Private Firms in China, 1990-2006
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Figure 4. Total Number of Private Firms in China, 1989-2006

Entrepreneurs in the private sector of Chinese economy have two major
characteristics. First, Chinese entrepreneurs only emerged after the economic reform in
1978. Before the economic reform, there were almost no private entrepreneurs existing in
the previous system of command economy. A series of market-oriented reforms brought
about the rise of Chinese entrepreneurs. The number of Chinese entrepreneurs has
increased dramatically accompanied by an increasing number of private firms. The
continued, though gradual, liberalization of the economic and political environment in
9

China has diminished the degree of political uncertainty, insecure property rights and
policy discrimination facing private entrepreneurs. Thus, these private entrepreneurs’
legal status has improved. Second, Chinese entrepreneurs can be owners of small
enterprises. Entrepreneurs in China are not necessarily owners and/or CEOs of large
corporations. Due to the fact that Chinese firms originally emerged as small family or
household enterprises, owners of small businesses can be identified as entrepreneurs as
well.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION
The political-economic context in China where Chinese entrepreneurs faced
institutional obstacles throughout most of the reform era has facilitated Chinese
entrepreneurs to seek external assistance for the betterment of their firms. One of the
most common ways of seeking external assistance involves using their own social capital.
The concept of social capital has been extensively and intensively studied by social
scientists and has received increasing attention at both the societal (Bourdieu 1985;
Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993) and the individual (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Lin
2001) levels. Three scholars – Bourdieu (1985), Coleman (1988) and Putman (1993) –
proposed different definitions of social capital at the community and societal level.
According to Bourdieu, social capital is a collective asset possessed by members of a
social network or a group. He puts forward that social capital is “the aggregate of the
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition – or in other
words, to membership in a group” (Bourdieu 1985: 248). For Coleman (1988: 98), social
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capital is “a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors – whether persons or
corporate actors within the structure.” Putnam takes a unique perspective asserting that
the degree of individuals’ civic engagement in a democratic society reflects the extent of
social capital in it. He states that “[…] social capital refers to connections among
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called ‘civic
virtue.’ The difference is that ‘social capital’ calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is
most powerful when embedded in a sense network of reciprocal social relations. A
society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital”
(Putnam 2000: 19). Social capital located in communities, regions and societies benefits
the overall well-being of a community or society (Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1988;
Putnam 1993). Whereas these scholars define social capital at the community and societal
level, others take an individual point of view. Social capital at the individual level is
defined as resources embedded in an individual’s relationships with other people (Burt
1992). Lin (2001: 25) defines social capital as “resources embedded in social networks
accessed and used by actors for actions.”
In recent decades, organizational scholars have extended the concept of social
capital to the organizational level. Social capital at the organizational level refers to
resources that an organization can acquire to achieve organizational goals (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). For example, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) define social capital as
“the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and
derived from the network of relations possessed by an individual or social unit.” Two
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common features of social capital can be identified from the above definitions. First,
resources of social capital are embedded in the social networks or relations instead of
individuals or social unites. Second, individuals or social units need to be aware of the
resources embedded in their social networks and take actions to get access to and use the
resources. In this study, I use the organizational-level social capital to indicate an
entrepreneur’s social capital, as explained in detail shortly. Further, my study delves into
how and to what extent entrepreneurs’ social capital poses influences on firms’
innovation performance. More specifically, my study primarily examines entrepreneurs’
networks at the firm level with other organizations. Within this context, an entrepreneur’s
social capital refers to resources embedded in a firm’s social networks with the
expectation to achieve its goals.

The Forms of Social Capital
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital has three dimensions:
the structural dimension, the relational dimension and the cognitive dimension. First, the
structural dimension refers to “the impersonal configuration of linkages between people
or units” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998: 244). It includes network density, connectivity,
centrality and hierarchy, which represents the “impersonal” nature of social capital.
Second, the relational dimension refers to the “personal relationships people have
developed with each other through a history of interactions” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal
1998: 244). It usually reflects the “interpersonal” aspect of social capital, including
respect, trust, trustworthiness, solidarity, norms, obligations and so on. The cognitive
dimension refers to “shared representations, interpretation, and systems of meaning
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among parties” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998: 244). The focus of this study is on the
structural dimension of social capital. More specifically, I examine the connectivity of
social capital in terms of social networks (i.e., social network in terms of networks with
universities or research institutions, inter-firm networks, social networks relates to a
firm’s location in an organizational field and professional networks).
Social networks provide individuals with benefits that other forms of capital, such
as economic or human capital, do not possess (Lin 2001), which can be applied to the
organizational study of social capital. First, social ties enable the flow of information. As
information asymmetry is evident in the current market, the accessibility to inside
information is a valuable resource to a company and its entrepreneurs. The flow of useful
information about opportunities and choices via social ties may reduce the transaction
cost and increase efficiency. Second, the role of a critical firm may exert significant
influences on the two sides of firms. Social ties with such critical firms may directly
determine whether a firm can secure a contract or not. Third, a firm’s social connections
to other firms or organizations or other organizations’ perception of their relationship
may give the firm social credentials. That is to say, a firm’s social connections to a
critical firm or organization may indicate that the individual may potentially have the
access to the resources of the firm or organization. Such social connections may enhance
the social certification of the firm. Fourth, social networks have the function of
reinforcing identity and recognition. If a firm’s renowned status within an industry is
highly recognized by other firms, the firm may gain the emotional support and public
acknowledgement of its entitlement to organizational status and certain resources
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attached to such status. Therefore, the resources embedded in social networks of a firm
may have influential impacts on the results of firm actions.
Social capital in the form of social networks is beneficial for innovations in two
ways (Zheng 2010). On the one hand, firms with interactions to other organizations are
more likely to be exposed to external ideas, knowledge and information. On the other
hand, the exchange and sharing of resources among organizations provides firms with
benefits such as knowledge sharing and reduction of transaction costs. The knowledge,
information and resources sourced from external organizations can be utilized to foster
innovations. Furthermore, some studies also find that network size has a great impact on
firms’ innovation (Hansen et al. 2005; McFadyen and Cannella 2004; Shan et al. 1994).
For instance, the more external contacts that the top management team and technologyrelated employees have are more likely to be associated with improvement of a firm’s
knowledge creation ability (Smith et al. 2005). Also, research and development (R&D)
projects teams with high firm performance usually keep in touch with a greater number of
contacts compared to those with low firm performance (Allen 1977). In my thesis, I
examine four types of social networks that entrepreneurs have used in the firms’ business
activities.
1) Networks with universities or research institutions. Such networks provide
entrepreneurs and their firms with the potential opportunities to gain access to external
knowledge, which may foster firms’ innovation. The number of direct partners that a firm
interacts with is positively associated with the number of product innovations it can
produce (Ahuja 2000). In technology- or knowledge-intensive sectors such as hightechnology sectors, specialized knowledge from many different areas needs to be
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combined and integrated to create or improve innovations (Lane et al. 2006). Universities
and research institutions are encouraged by an increasing number of policy initiatives to
develop ties with local business, and thus they are regarded as significant resources of
information and knowledge for local business community (Huggins et al. 2008; Kitagawa
2004). Furthermore, research networks have great impacts on the radicalness of
innovation and entrepreneurs’ decisions of adopting and developing new products
(Landry et al. 2002). It also suggests that the degree of radical innovation is based on
ideas and knowledge created by various research organizations, such as universities and
research institutes. The exchange and combination of specialized knowledge, if not
available internally, can be acquired through social networks in terms of research
networks (Subramaniam and Youndt 2005).
2) Inter-firm networks. Such networks refer to firms’ exchange and sharing of
information and knowledge with each other, or collaboration together. Chesbrough
(2003) suggests that firms innovate through a complex and continuous series of
interaction with external actors, including other innovative firms, rather than try to
generate innovative products by themselves. A firm’s frequent interactions with other
firms through collaboration may assist the firm to access knowledge and/or innovations.
It is a means of exploiting existing knowledge and/or innovation and converting it into
their own competitive advantage. Huggins and Johnson (2010) distinguish two types of
networks (i.e., contact networks and alliance networks) that have direct relationship with
firm innovativeness. Alliance networks are through “formalized collaboration and joint
ventures, and other ‘contracted’ relationships resulting in frequent and repeated
interaction” (Huggins and Johnson 2010: 460). Through alliance networks, firms
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maintained prolonged and repeated interactions with each other, obtain valuable
information from partner firms and collaborate to innovate.
3) The third type of social networks relates to a firm’s location in an
organizational field, through which “enduring” (Podolny and Page 1998) or “sustained”
(Huggins 2001) interactions in a certain region are beneficial for knowledge
and/technology transfer and collaboration among firms. Cluster policies by governments
facilitate to foster an organizational or institutional field within the local socio-economic
context. Studies show that geographical proximity in regional clusters offers local firms
with opportunities and convenience to collaborate and thus lead to a greater firm
innovation performance (Chiu and Lee 2012; De Dominicis, Florax, and De Groot 2013).
The concept of “innovative milieux” was proposed by some scholars to explain the
impacts of social capital on innovation at the regional level. It refers to “a context for
development, which empowers and guides innovative agents to be able to innovate and to
co-ordinate with other innovating agents” (Storper 1995: 203). Science and technology
parks can be regarded as a form of such innovative milieux. They enable and foster the
collaboration among firms through knowledge flow and easy access to resources, and
thus provide fundamental elements for innovation development (Martinez-Canas, RuizPalomino and Saez-Martinez 2011; Zhang and Tian 2012). In the context of China,
Chinese government established Industrial Parks (IPs), Science Parks (SPs), and Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) in selected coastal areas. Companies in the same sector,
especially high-technology companies, are more likely to be located in the same IPs, SPs
or SEPZs. Such environments may encourage firms within the same organizational field
to rely on each other’s technological advantages and to collaborate on common projects.
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4) Professional networks may facilitate innovation through membership of one or
more organizations, within which different information, knowledge and resources with
potential benefits flow. Business associations and organizations are usually associated
with local activities at the regional level. Professional members participate in the local
activities, through which they can build professional networks and get in touch with
people who may provide individuals with useful industrial information and ideas as well
as opportunities of collaboration (Dakhli and De Clercq 2004). For example, according to
Chell and Banies (2000), small businesses entrepreneurs utilize their professional
networks with contacts in organizations such as Chambers of Commerce and Small
Business Federations, through which they can obtain useful ideas and information
otherwise they cannot access to. In addition to ideas and information, resources such as
venture capital are another potential benefits when entrepreneurs join in a dense network
of associations or organizations within a region. Venture capital is identified as one of the
fundamental elements in starting innovative activities. The chances of locating capital for
project funding are greatly enhanced if entrepreneurs have professional networks with
influential individuals in the business associations or other types of organizations
(Tyebjee and Bruno 1984). According to Dakhli and De Clercq (2004), associational
activity is positively linked to R&D expenditures, a significant indicator of innovation.
The exchange of information, knowledge and resources is important in generating,
developing and enhancing innovation. Therefore, the membership within associations
may provide members with opportunities to gain access to inside information, external
funding and political support, which have the potential for firms to increase innovative
activities.
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The consistent message from these four forms of social networks is that social
capital with regard to networks to other organizations provides firms with external access
to valuable ideas, information, knowledge and resources, which may be utilized by firms
to generate, develop and enhance innovation. Hence, this study examines social capital in
the form of entrepreneurs’ networks with other organizations for three aspects: networks
with universities or research institutions, inter-firm networks, networks in an
organizational field, and professional networks, leading to my second core hypothesis:
H1: An entrepreneur’s social capital is positively associated with a firm’s
innovation performance.

POLITICAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION
Whereas the positive and critical role of entrepreneurs’ social capital in enhancing
firm performance and innovativeness is widely recognized, the effects of their political
capital demand for more careful and deeper examination. Scholars haven’t reached
consensus on the definition of political capital. Some scholars use it to evaluate the
resources of elected government officials (Kang and Greene 1999), whereas others focus
on citizens’ participation in the political field (Booth and Richard 1998). My study has an
emphasis on the entrepreneurs’ and their firms’ relationships and ties with government
agencies and government officials, and how such connections might facilitate, mediate or
impede firms’ innovative activities. In my analysis, political capital has three features.
First, political capital involves political institutions (e.g., government agencies), within
which politicians and government officials have positional power and are expected to be
able to provide resources to entrepreneurs and their firms. Second, political capital means
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the resources that entrepreneurs and their firms expect to receive from political
institutions and/or governmental officials (Blumentritt and Rehbein 2008). Third,
political capital shares with social capital the characteristics of social relationships.
Relational ties serve as conduits through which information and resources flow between
entrepreneurs (and their firms) and political institutions and/or governmental officials
(Lin 2001). Thus, in my study, entrepreneurs’ political capital is defined as resources that
are expected from the relationships between entrepreneurs (and their firms) and
governmental agencies. In particular, I focus on two dimensions of an entrepreneur’s
political capital – which I term as impersonal political capital measured by the
government’s assistance to the firm through formal ways and personal political capital
measured by an entrepreneur’s received resources originating from his/her own
connections with political institutions and/or governmental officials.

Impersonal Political Capital
Political capital and its role in determining firm performance, embedded in the
nature of political-economic institutions, are context-specific. Political and economic
institutions play an important role in entrepreneurial and innovative activities in all
economies. In the capitalist economies, the liberal capitalism has been dominating the
Western world for more than three centuries. Adam Smith’s (1776/2000) work, marked
as the milestone of today’s liberal capitalism, argues that a market develops freely
through competition among profit-driven, rational individuals while the invisible hand —
the state — acts as “a supporter of capitalism” (Wang 2013: 36), by legislating rules,
monitoring the market and managing the tension between market and society.
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Challenging the liberal economic approach, political economist Polanyi (1944[2001])
takes a step further to emphasize the state’s role in the market. He argues that a market
develops under the political intervention, and a strong and supportive state can react to
the economic uncertainty and market crisis with relief and protection and promote both
capitalism and democracy. Fligstein (2005) takes a political-cultural approach to claim
that state and market are intimately interconnected with each other and firms in the
market depend on the state to provide protection and preserve their power in both
domestic and global market.
In the emerging capitalist economies, the states take a “developmental” route to
serve as “tools of economic growth” (Wang 2013: 39), especially in East Asian countries
such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Contradictory to the neoclassical, “Smithian”
view that state intervention goes against economic growth, Evans (1995) argues that the
state can actually facilitate, instead of merely intervening and impeding, economic
development if the roles of a state fit its social context and are well executed by political
elites. Four roles of the state in relation to industry are presented as custodian
(regulation), demiurge (production), midwifery (state creation of private firms with
subsidies, tax breaks and other forms of incentives) and husbandry (further state
encouragement and promotion of private firms). Take South Korea as an example.
During the 1970s and 1980s, to promote the information-technology sector the South
Korean government combined the two roles of “midwife” and “husband” in blending
both public and private efforts, and thus implemented a series of incentive policies, such
as financial support and tax breaks for research and development (R&D) and grants for
research projects, to develop the cutting-edge computer memory chips. The success and
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boom of Korean firms in both domestic and international market for chips and other
computer technologies are based on what Evans termed as “embedded autonomy” – “a
contradictory combination of corporate coherence and connectedness” (Evans 1995: 12).
That is to say, a developmental state requires both a mature state bureaucracy and a dense
network of social ties between political elites and business actors. In another crossnational study, he enlarges the sample from developmental countries to all developing
countries to analyze how bureaucracy facilitates economic growth. The results support
his prediction that “Weberian” state bureaucratic apparatus characterized by meritocratic
recruitment and a predictable, long-term rewarding system is positively associated with
economic growth rates (Evans and Rauch 1999). As a result, capitalist entrepreneurial
firms with governmental assistance or promotion are more likely to perform better in
developmental states.
In transition economies, the strong state control declines along with the economic
and political reforms, but still remains higher level of controlling power than that of
capitalist and emerging economies. Prior to the transition in these countries, the political
regime and command economy supported each other though discipline and cohesion of
the one-party apparatus (Walder 1995). Communist parties distributed and redistributed
almost everything, including resources and opportunities. In such social context, no
private firms have existed and state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises were the
two forms of enterprises. The economic reforms in communist countries brought about
departures from central planning and the development of private market and
entrepreneurial firms. Some former communist counties in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe took a rapid privatization of market and constructed democratic political
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institutions. However, in the context of China, the Chinese government has chosen a
“gradualist” way of carrying out the economic reform since the late 1970s. Enterprises
began to have some degree of freedom to make profits for themselves legally after they
completed the fixed plan and distributed the profits. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping officially
announced China to become a market-oriented socialist economy. It wasn’t until 1993
that China’s economy actually entered into the market track. Guthrie’s empirical study
(1999) adopts an institutional approach, arguing that “organizations are as likely to act
according to social norms and mandates of the institutional and cultural environments in
which they are embedded as they are to act according to the nebulous push of the
market’s invisible hand” (Guthrie 1999:9). That is to say, Chinese firms only appear to be
legitimate and market savvy by mimicking rational bureaucratic structures, decisionmaking process and practices of foreign firms. Therefore, the Chinese government
resembles a “developmental” state in the following two respects: the strong one-party
leadership and elite bureaucracy, on one hand; and the close ties between market and
state and economic and political structures that promote the economic transition and
development, on the other hand (Wang 2013).
However, labeling China as a “developmental” state is troublesome because of
China’s former economic system as command economy and lack of “embedded
autonomy” in state-society relationship. The consistent message is that Chinese
government remains “significant control over the market, influencing the free allocation
of economic resources” (Chen et al. 2012: 874) and may have a great power over the
future development of firms. In the process of technology upgrading, the Chinese
government has initiated and implemented a series of strategic plans and policies to
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regulate the market, enable and encourage cooperation among firms and between firms
and governments. As stated earlier, the economic reform beginning from the late 1970s
has gradually led China to a globalization route. The implementation of “socialist market
economy” in 1992 greatly encouraged foreign multi-national enterprises (MNEs) to make
investments in Chinese firms. China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 characterizes a big
step to engage in the global market. Coming along with the MNEs’ investments is the
transfer of advanced technology and know-how. However, it is impractical to expect
MNEs to transfer the latest or most advanced technologies to Chinese firms. Therefore,
China seeks its own ways to advance technologies and promote innovations domestically
while keeping favorable policies to attract foreign investments. For example, China’s
five-year 2006 to 2010 plan focused on indigenous innovation (Dedrick and Tang 2012).
First, it promotes domestic standards and technologies by pushing Chinese standards as
international standards. Second, to promote domestic innovation, China provides tax
incentives and other financial benefits to firms that set up R&D centers in China. In this
way, China supports domestically owned companies with an emphasis on innovation
development.
Therefore, Chinese firms are still under great influence of governmental direction
and regulation due to the role of Chinese government as a “strong” state. Some studies
have shown that entrepreneurs’ active political participation in politics provides easier
access to external financing from banking sectors in transition economies (Bai et al.
2006) and preferential treatment in terms of granted preferential policies, assistance in
land purchase and access to government contracts (Zhao et al. 2011). Although many
studies have investigated how the Chinese government’s assistance encourages firms’
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overall performance, a relatively few number of studies have examined the relationship
between government assistance and firms’ innovation performance. Wang’s empirical
study (2012) is one of the few that have demonstrated the positive effects of Chinese
government’s investments (favorable policies aiming at transferring advanced technology
through foreign direct investment to Chinese local firms) on improving the innovative
abilities of local firms. We can see that through the indirect institutional ties with
governments, the Chinese government affords firms with additional assistance to enhance
China’s overall innovative abilities. Hence, this leads to my hypothesis:
H2a: An entrepreneur’s impersonal political capital is positively associated with
a firm’s innovation performance.

Personal Political Capital
Under such political and economic institutional context, political ties are vital in
China because political actors can pose incentives or constraints on economic activities
and frequent interactions with government officials may bring strong government
assistance. One important way for Chinese entrepreneurs to build political ties is through
Party membership. Current studies suggest that entrepreneurs’ membership in the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a means of political investment of Chinese firms (Liu
2003). An entrepreneur’s identity as a Party member or a higher position in the CCP
hierarchy to some extent legitimizes the firm’s position in the market. Entrepreneurs have
actively invested in securing CCP membership because their political participation in
CCP may facilitate the firm to reduce institutional barriers, secure government assistance,
and acquire access to valuable resources. Although private entrepreneurs were politically
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discriminated in most years of China’s reform era, since the late 1990s, the political
leadership has started to invite entrepreneurs to join in the CCP, witnessing the rapid
development of the private sector and its increasing contributions to the Chinese
economy.
Entrepreneurs’ direct, close ties with government officials developed through
informal ways may also open a door for them to gain external resources from the
government. Peng and Luo (2000) find that managerial ties with government officials are
important in improving firm performance. It is beneficial to have close ties with
government officials because an entrepreneur may get access to funding, information,
opportunities and support services, which he/she can hardly acquire otherwise, from
government, and, thereby, promote business transactions. An entrepreneur who expects to
benefit from such political ties need to foster continuous contacts with government
officials; otherwise, the close ties between the two may fade away eventually (Zhou
2008).
Furthermore, if an entrepreneur served as a government official before the present
position as a firm’s CEO, or was appointed by government, his/her political ties with
previous government colleagues may be beneficial in ways of increasing the possibility
of gaining valuable resources and competitive advantages. Zhang and Zhang (2005) point
out that the presence of former government officials as employees or advisors helps
reduce uncertainties. Besides, the effectiveness of entrepreneurs’ political ties is of great
importance. Entrepreneurs’ political ties may have neither positive nor negative effects
on firms’ performance if entrepreneurs only remain the Party membership and do not
interact with government officials.
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However, we should be aware that the role of personal political capital is not
necessarily positive to a firm’s innovativeness. Long-term and stable connections with
government officials may result in organizational inertia for a firm (Zhou 2013). For
example, a firm may have less pressure to manage to adapt to environmental changes if it
has constant and friendly political connections with government officials. That is because
the firm can acquire confidential information, external resources and other forms of
preferential treatment from government officials. In some cases, government officials
may even provide protections for politically connected firms. On the contrary, a firm
without such political connections with government officials may have to take immediate
actions to adjust to the external context and fight for survival. Therefore, if an
entrepreneur’s personal political capital brings the firm organizational inertia, such
political capital could actually exert negative influences to a firm’s innovative activities.
Although we have a rich body of studies that tend to argue for the importance of
an entrepreneur’s political capital on firm performance in general, limited research in the
current literature examines how an entrepreneur’s political capital affects firms’
innovation performance. My study extends previous research to investigate how an
entrepreneur’s political capital at both the firm and individual levels influences a firm’s
innovation performance. As the Chinese government plays an important role in making
the political and economic institutional changes, an entrepreneur who has close
connections with government officials may be able to gain preferential treatments from
government, such as tax exemption, contracts with government and other forms of
governmental assistance. My initial assumption is that with external funding, preferential
treatment and better institutional environment, entrepreneurs may be more willing to
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initiate innovative activities in their firms. The possibility of converting the above
benefits into innovative activities is higher for entrepreneurs with political capital than for
those without. However, organizational inertia caused by personal political ties may lead
to downward and negative effects on firm innovative activities. Hence, I propose a set of
two opposing hypotheses to examine the role of an entrepreneur’s political ties in
affecting a firm’s innovation performance:
H2b: An entrepreneur’s personal political capital is positively associated with a
firm’s innovation performance.
H2c: An entrepreneur’s personal political capital is negatively associated with a
firm’s innovation performance.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Sample
To test the hypotheses above, I used the 2003 WBIC Survey dataset, which
provides a firm-level nationally representative sample. The WBIC survey collected data
on 2400 firms randomly selected in 18 middle- and large-size cities in 15 provincial-level
regions, covering a wide range of regions in China. They range from poor western
regions such as Yunnan and Gansu, to relatively better-off middle regions such as Hubei
and Hunan, and to the most prosperous eastern regions such as Zhejiang and Liaoning.
The sample also includes firms from different industrial sectors, varying from laborintensive sectors to technology-intensive sectors. The survey has two parts. First, through
face-to-face interviews, senior managers provided information about many aspects of
firm activities, such as production, sales, trade and innovation, and detailed information
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regarding CEOs and Boards of Directors. Second, firms’ accountant and personnel
manager filled detailed information on companies’ shares of ownership types, finances,
accounting and labor force.
Because the focus of this study is on private firms, I excluded firms with
dominant state ownership and thus ended up with a sample of 1,655 (68.96% of the total)
private firms for analysis. Table 1 includes means and standard deviations of all the
variables used in my analysis. Table 2 presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix among
all the variables used in my analysis. The correlation coefficients between most variables
are quite low, indicating that multicolinearity is not a concern in my analysis.

Table 1: List of Variables in the Analysis
Continuous Variables
Log of total sales of the firm (unit: RMB
1,000 yuan)
Number of competitors in domestic market
Years of holding CEO position

Observations

Mean

SD

1,914

9.00

2.29

1,878
1,923

3.84
16.81

1.34
4.75

Observations

Percentage
(%)

1,891

18.83

1,893

17.54

1,900

28.47

1,909

56.78

1,887

60.68

1,910

5.60

1,903

18.44

Dummy Variables
Whether the firm had formal contracts with local universities or
research institutes (dummy = 1 if yes)
Whether the firm had formal contracts with other firms in terms
of technological cooperation (dummy = 1 if yes)
Whether the firm was located in an IP, SP, or EPZ (dummy = 1
if yes)
Whether the firm was a member of a business association
(dummy = 1 if yes)
Whether the CEO was a Party member (dummy = 1 if yes)
Whether the CEO was a former government official (dummy =
1 if yes)
Whether the CEO was appointed by the government (dummy =
1 if yes)
Ordinal Variables
Firm innovativeness (N=)

Categories
0 = No innovativeness
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Observations
567

Percentage
(%)
32.29

Table 1 (Continued)
Ordinal Variables
Firm innovativeness (N=)
Founding year of the firm
(N=1,924)
Government’s assistance
(N=1,875)

Categorical Variables
Ratio of engineering and technical
personnel to total employees
(N=1,889)
Industrial sector by level of
technology (N=1,924)
Level of CEO’s education
(N=1,915)

Categories
1 = Low innovativeness
2 = High innovativeness
0 = Prior to 1979
1 = Between 1979 and 1993
2 = After 1993
0 = No assistance
1 = Low assistance
2 = High assistance
Categories
0 = No
1 = Low ratio
2 = Medium ratio
3 = High ratio
0 = No tech
1 = Low tech
2 = Medium tech
3 = High tech
0 = Other degree
1 = Undergraduate degree
2 = Postgraduate degree
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Observations
990
315
251
617
1,056
1,293
437
145
Observations
416
837
409
227
417
373
707
427
355
1,264
296

Percentage
(%)
52.88
16.83
13.05
32.07
54.89
68.96
23.31
7.73
Percentage
(%)
22.02
44.31
21.65
12.02
21.67
19.39
36.75
22.19
18.54
66.01
15.47

Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix among Variables Used in the Analysis
Variables
(1) Firm’s innovation
performance
(2) Formal contacts
with local universities
or research institutions
(3) Formal contacts
with other local firms
(4) Firm location in an
IP, SP, or EPZ
(5) Membership in a
business association
(6) Government’s
assistance
(7) Party membership
(8) CEO as former
government official
(9) CEO appointed by
government
(10) Log of total sales
of the firm
(11) Founding year of
the firm
(12) Number of
competitors in
domestic market
(13) Sector by tech
level
(14) Degree received
by CEO
(15) Years of
experience as CEO
(16) Ratio of
engineering and
technical personnel to
total employees

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

1.00
.31

1.00

.29

.30

1.00

.26

.24

.18

1.00

.22

.18

.11

.06

1.00

.29

.28

.21

.20

.20

1.00

-.04

.05

.04

-.07

.11

.06

1.00

-.05

-.00

-.04

-.04

.07

-.01

.11

1.00

-.11

-.03

-.02

-.15

-.02

-.05

.24

.07

1.00

.38

.23

.18

.24

.23

.30

.04

-.01

-.09

1.00

.08

.03

.02

.19

-.06

-.01

-.22

.08

-.33

-.00

1.00

-.20

-.13

-.09

-.19

-.00

-.10

-.04

.01

.02

-.24

-.03

1.00

-.15

-.02

.01

-.13

.07

-.14

.06

.15

.05

-.17

.07

.04

1.00

.21

.22

.13

.22

.18

.16

.06

.04

-.06

.25

.10

-.11

-.18

1.00

.02

-.06

-.00

-.01

.03

.05

.02

-.04

.08

-.03

-.20

.03

-.13

-.13

1.00

.16

.22

.12

.22

.11

.14

-.01

.01

-.07

.15

.12

-.15

-.03

.24

-.07
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1.00

Dependent Variable: Firm’s Innovation Performance
I constructed an ordinal variable to measure a firm’s innovation performance. In
the survey, six questions were asked to identify if a firm had innovation activities: a)
introducing new products (or services) in existing business; b) entering new business line;
c) introducing new process improvements; d) introducing new management techniques;
e) conducting new quality controls in production, and f) having patent acquisition
between 1999 and 2002. Each of these indicators was coded as dummies. I coded 1 as the
value if a firm has a positive response and 0 if a negative 1. To examine firms’ level of
innovativeness, I added up the number of a firm’s responses to make an index of
innovation performance on a scale of 0-6. Since the index of firms’ innovation
performance is not normally distributed, I recoded the index into three categories: 1) no
innovativeness if the index equals 0; 2) low innovativeness if the index ranges from 1 to
4; and 3) high innovativeness if the index ranges from 5 to 6.

Independent Variables
1) An entrepreneur’s social capital in the form of four types of networks, namely
networks with universities or research institutions, inter-firm networks, networks in an
organizational field, and professional networks. First, an entrepreneur’s networks with
universities or research institutions are measured by one question, asking whether a firm
had formal contracts with local universities or research institutes (dummy = 1, if yes).
Second, an entrepreneur’s inter-firm networks are measured by a questions, asking
whether the firm had formal contracts with other firms in terms of technological
cooperation (dummy = 1, if yes). Third, an entrepreneur’s networks in an organizational
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field are measured by a question asking whether the firm was located in an IP, SP, or
EPZ (dummy = 1, if yes). Fourth, an entrepreneur’s professional networks is measured by
one indicator that shows whether the firm was a member of a business association
(dummy = 1, if yes).
2) An entrepreneur’s political capital in the form of impersonal and personal
political capital. First, impersonal political capital is measured by the degree of the
government’s assistance to a firm. The survey asked six questions regarding whether the
government assisted the firm to a) identify foreign investors, b) locate foreign technology
to license, c) identify potential foreign clients, d) identify potential foreign suppliers, e)
obtain bank financing and f) identify potential domestic clients. To analyze the intensity
of impersonal political capital, I added up a firm’s responses to all six questions and
constructed an ordinal variable to measure the degree of government assistance: 1 = no
government assistance (if a firm received none of the above-mentioned government
assistances); 2 = low government assistance (if a firm received any one type of the abovementioned six government assistances); and 3 = high government assistance (if a firm
received any two or more of the above-mentioned six government assistances). Second, I
constructed the following three dummy variables to measure an entrepreneur’s personal
political capital: a) whether the CEO is a Party member (dummy = 1, if yes) indicates the
formal political connection with government; b) whether the CEO was a former
government official (dummy = 1, if yes); c) whether the CEO was appointed by the
government (dummy = 1, if yes).
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Control Variables
1) Firm characteristics. First, I used a firm’s total sales to reflect its firm size in
that firm size indicates a firm’s market position and financial strength. This can serve as
an important factor in influencing a firm’s own R&D efforts. Second, a firm’s founding
year can also have an effect on its innovation performance. Due to the economic reform
in China, Chinese firms experienced two turning points over the three decades. The firms
founded after 1979 were regulated under a new market structure as in 1979 China
initiated a market-oriented reform. Since 1994, new company structures were built
because the Company Law was initiated in that year and many previously state-owned
companies were converted into shareholding companies. Therefore, I constructed an
ordinal variable to measure a firm’s founding year: 0 = before 1979, 1 = between 1979
and 1993, 2 = after 1993.
2) Degree of market competition. A firm’s market position and its economic
activities including innovations are shaped by the degree of market competition at the
national level. In my analysis I controlled by the number of competitors in domestic
market to reflect the degree of market competition.
3) Industry. Considering that different industrial sectors have various
governmental regulations, industrial policies and technological change, the firms were
classified into four groups according to the level of technology. This is based on Fu and
Gong’s (2011) division methods of technological capacities in Chinese industrial sectors
and industry-level indicators used in the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics.
Hence, the four categories of the firms based on the technology level are: 1) 0 = others
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that technology is not relevant, 2) 1 = low technology level, 3) 2 = medium technology
level, 4) 3 = high technology level.
4) Human capital. As widely recognized both by economists and sociologists, an
entrepreneur’s own human capital as well as the employees’ human capital in a firm play
an important role on firm performance and its innovative activities (Bruderl et al. 1992;
Ganotakis 2012; Marvel and Lumpkin 2007). In my analysis, I control for two indicators
measuring an entrepreneur’s human capital: a) the entrepreneur’s received education,
which was coded as a categorical variable: 0 = other education (such as no education,
primary school education, secondary education or high-school education), 1 =
undergraduate education and 2 = postgraduate education; b) an entrepreneur’s years of
experience as a CEO. Moreover, I constructed an ordinal variable to measure the overall
level of a firm’s human capital. I computed the ratio of the number of engineering and
technical personnel to the total number of a firm’s employees. Then I categorized the
ratio into four groups: 0 = no engineering and technical personnel, 1 = low ratio, 2 =
medium ratio and 3 = high ratio.

Statistical Methods
In this study, considering the non-continuous and ordered nature of the dependent
variable, I used a generalized linear model with a multinomial distribution and a
cumulative logit link function to test my hypotheses. The following is my model:

E[Y] = α + β1Xk1 + β2Xk2 + β3Xk3+ a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 + ei
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E[Y] represents the expected value for firm i. α is an intercept. Xi1 represents an
entrepreneur’s social capital. Xi2 represents an entrepreneur’s impersonal political capital.
Xi3 represents an entrepreneur’s personal political capital. a1, a2, a3 , a4 represents the
control variables, namely firm size, founding year of the firm, industrial sectors by
technology level, degree of market competition, CEO’s received education, CEO’s years
of experience and ratio of engineering and technical employees. ei is the error term. (All
analyses were performed in SPSS version 21.)

RESULTS
Table 3 represents the exponentiated coefficients [ie. the exp(βk)] from
generalized linear models, which allows me to interpret changes in the odds ratio.
Holding all other variables constant, for every one-unit change in Xk, the expected value
of odds ratio on firm innovativeness changes by a factor of exp(βk). P value less than
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 are considered statistically significant.

Table 3. Exponentiated Coefficients for Predictors on Firm Innovativeness
Variables
Social Capital
 Formal contacts
with local
universities or
research
institutions
 Formal contacts
with other local
firms
 Firm location in an
IP, SP, or EPZ

Model 1

Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Exponentiated coefficients or ratios

Model 6

2.25***
(.13)

2.08***
(.13)

2.09***
(.13)

2.27***
(.13)

2.18***
(.13)

2.19***
(.13)

1.48**
(.12)

1.42**
(.12)

1.39**
(.12)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Variables

Model 1

 Membership in a
business
association
Impersonal Political Capital
 Low state
assistance[a]
 High state
assistance [a]
Personal Political Capital
 CEO’s Party
membership
 CEO as former
government
official
 CEO appointed by
government
Controls
 Log of firm’s total
1.34***
sales
(.02)
 Firm’s founding
1.22
year (between
(.13)
1979-1993)[b]
 Firm’s founding
1.40**
year (post 1993)[b]
(.12)
.89**
 No. of competitors
(.04)
 Sector by
1.98***
technology level
(.15)
(low tech) [c]
 Sector by
2.61***
technology level
(.13)
[c]
(medium tech)
 Sector by
2.44***
technology level
(.14)
(high tech)[c]
 Degree received
by CEO
1.46**
(undergraduate
(.13)
degree) [d]
 Degree received
by CEO
2.85***
(postgraduate
(.17)
[d]
degree)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Exponentiated coefficients or ratios
1.94***
(.10)
2.11***
(.11)
2.51***
(.18)

2.13***
(.11)
2.55***
(.18)

1.86***
(.10)

1.88***
(.10)

1.67***
(.11)
1.75**
(.18)

1.69***
(.11)
1.79**
(.18)

.83
(.10)

.79*
(.11)

.91
(.20)

.94
(.20)

.89
(.12)

.96
(.12)

1.26***
(.02)

1.29***
(.02)

1.29***
(.02)

1.24***
(.02)

1.24***
(.02)

1.29
(.13)

1.29
(.13)

1.19
(.14)

1.33*
(.14)

1.25**
(.14)

1.43**
(.13)
.90**
(.04)

1.47**
(.12)
.89**
(.04)

1.31*
(.14)
.89**
(.04)

1.48**
(.13)
.90**
(.04)

1.34*
(.14)
.90**
(.04)

1.95***
(.16)

1.78***
(.15)

1.72***
(.15)

1.84***
(.16)

1.79***
(.16)

2.33***
(.14)

2.49***
(.13)

2.41***
(.14)

2.30***
(.14)

2.25***
(.14)

2.16***
(.15)

2.32***
(.14)

2.27***
(.14)

2.12***
(.15)

2.08***
(.15)

1.23
(.13)

1.39*
(.13)

1.43**
(.13)

1.21
(.13)

1.23
(.13)

2.03**
(.18)

2.61***
(.17)

2.67***
(.17)

1.98***
(.18)

2.04***
(.18)
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Table 3 (Continued)
Variables
 Years of
experience as CEO
 Ratio of
engineering and
technical
personnel to total
employees (low
ratio) [e]
 Ratio of
engineering and
technical
personnel to total
employees
(medium ratio) [e]
 Ratio of
engineering and
technical
personnel to total
employees (high
ratio) [e]

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Exponentiated coefficients or ratios
1.01
(.01)

1.01
(.01)

1.01
(.01)

1.01
(.01)

1.01
(.01)

1.01
(.01)

1.30*
(.13)

1.24
(.13)

1.27
(.13)

1.26
(.13)

1.22
(.13)

1.22
(.13)

1.55**
(.15)

1.27
(.15)

1.46
(.15)

1.44*
(.15)

1.24
(.15)

1.23
(.15)

1.34
(.17)

.95
(.18)

1.26
(.17)

1.25
(.17)

.94
(.18)

.94
(.18)

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Note: [a] Reference group as the firms that receive no state assistance. [b] Reference
group as the firms that were founded prior to 1979. [c] Reference group as nontechnology sector. [d] Reference group as the education degree received by CEO that is
not undergraduate or postgraduate degree. [e] Reference group as the firms’ ratio of
engineering and technical personnel that were equal to zero. Numbers in the parentheses
are standard errors.

First, I found positive, statistically significant effects of an entrepreneur’s social
capital on firm innovativeness and thus my first hypothesis is supported. All four
indicators for measuring an entrepreneur’s social capital, including a firm’s networks
with universities or research institutes, a firm’s networks with other firms, a firm’s
location in an organizational field, and firm CEO’s professional networks, are found to
have statistically significant positive effects on firms’ innovation performance throughout
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all models. Specifically, the firms having formal contracts in terms of technology
cooperation with universities or research institutes are more likely to innovate compared
to those without such contracts in all models; the ratios are 2.08 and larger, all significant
at the .001 level. This suggests that a firm’s innovativeness increases by 108% or higher
if the entrepreneur of the firm has made formal contracts with universities or research
institutes in terms of technological cooperation. Throughout all models, firms which have
formal contracts with other firms in terms of technology collaboration are 2.18 times (or
higher) more innovative than those without such contracts (all significant at the .01
level). This indicates that a firm’s innovativeness level increases by at least 118% in the
case that the firm has formal contracts regarding technological collaboration with other
firms. Moreover, firm innovativeness is higher for firms which are located in an IP, SP or
EPZ than those located outside of organizational fields; the ratios are1.39 and larger, all
statistically significant at the .01 or .05 level. If a firm is located in SP, IP or EPZ, its
chance of improving firm innovation performance increases by 39% or higher. Compared
to firms with no membership in a business association, firm innovativeness is higher for
those holding a membership in a business association; and the ratios are 1.86 and larger,
all statistically significant at the .001 level. That is to say, the membership of a firm
within a business association increases its chance of increasing firm innovativeness by at
least 86%. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, my findings confirm that an entrepreneur’s
social capital is statistically significant and positively related to firms’ innovation
performance.
Second, Models 3 to 6 show the positive impact of entrepreneurs’ impersonal
political capital, measured by the degree of state assistance, is statistically significant
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throughout all models. The odds ratios of both low and high degrees of state assistance
are statistically significant, and positively related to firms’ innovation performance,
supporting Hypothesis 2a. Compared to the firms with no state assistance, the firms with
low degree of state assistance have significant larger innovativeness level (the odds ratios
are 1.67 and larger; all statistically significant at the .001 level). The firms with high
degree state assistance have significant larger mean innovative level throughout all
models (the odds ratios are 1.75 and larger; all statistically significant at the .001 or .05
level). More specifically, when the effect of social capital is excluded (Model 3), the
firms that receive low degree of state assistance are likely to increase their innovativeness
by 111%, and the firms that receive high degree of state assistance are likely to increase
their innovativeness by 151%. When the effect of an entrepreneur’s personal political
capital is included (Model 4), the firms that receive low degree of state assistance are
likely to increase their innovativeness by 113%, and the firms that receive high degree of
state assistance are likely to increase their innovativeness by 155%. When the effect of
social capital is included (Model 5), the firms that receive low degree of state assistance
are likely to increase their innovativeness by 67%, and the firms that receive high degree
of state assistance are likely to increase their innovativeness by 75%. When all the
independent variables are included (Model 6), the firms that receive low degree of state
assistance are likely to increase their innovativeness by 69%, and the firms that receive
high degree of state assistance are likely to increase their innovativeness by 79%. These
findings support Hypothesis 2a that an entrepreneur’s impersonal political capital is
positively associated with a firm’s innovation performance.
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Third, Model 4 and 6 show the weak and negative effects of an entrepreneur’s
personal political capital on firm innovation performance. I used three dummy variables,
apart from other variables, to test entrepreneurs’ personal political capital: CEO’s Party
membership, whether CEO was a former government official, and whether CEO was
appointed by the government. In these two models, CEO’s Party membership shows a
negative, statistically significant effect on firms’ innovation performance. Compared to
firms whose CEO is not a Party member, the firms whose CEOs are Party members
are .83 times less likely to innovate when an entrepreneur’s impersonal political capital
was controlled in Model 4, which is not statistically significant. In Model 6, when
entrepreneurs’ social capital and impersonal political capital were controlled, the firms
whose CEOs are Party members are .79 times less likely to conduct innovative activities
than firms whose CEOs are not, which is statistically significant at .05 level. However,
the other two variables – whether CEO was a former government official or appointed by
government – show no statistically significant effects on firm innovativeness. According
to the above findings, I found a weak and negative association between an entrepreneur’s
personal political capital and a firm’s innovation performance, which supports
Hypothesis 2c.
Finally, I had several findings about the effects of control variables (i.e. total
sales, founding year, number of competitors, industrial sectors by technological level,
entrepreneur’s received degree, years of experience as CEO, and the ratio of engineering
and technical personnel to total employees). First, throughout all models, a firm’s
characteristics have positive, statistically significant effects on firm innovativeness. A
firm’s total sales are statistically significant at the .001 level; and ratios are 1.24 and
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larger. This suggests that a firm’s innovativeness increases as a firm becomes larger and
more profitable. Second, the positive effect of a firm’s founding year on firm
innovativeness is statistically significant. Firms are more likely to engage in innovative
activities if they were founded after 1979. In each of these six models, the ratio of firms
founded between 1979 and 1993 is higher than that of firms founded after 1993, which
suggests that the innovation ability of firms founded after 1993 is greater than that of
firms founded between 1979 and 1993. Third, market competition has a negative,
statistically significant effect on firms’ innovation performance. When the market
becomes more competitive, firms are less likely to generate innovations. Fourth, I had
mixed findings for the industrial sectors by technology levels. Whether a firm is within
an industrial sector with low, medium or high technology level has statistically
significant effects on a firm’s innovation performance. Compared to firms that do not
conduct business relevant to technologies, firms with low, medium and high levels of
technology are more likely to innovate; and the ratios are 1.72 and larger. Fifth, as for the
effect of individual-level and firm-level human capital on firm innovativeness, I also had
mixed findings. CEOs with undergraduate degrees have statistically significant influence
on firms’ innovation performance in Model 1, 3 and 4, and other models do not show
statistically significant effect. The effects of CEOs’ undergraduate education were
mediated when entrepreneurs’ social capital was controlled in Model 2, 5 and 6. The
positive effects of CEOs with postgraduate degrees are statistically significant at the .001
or .01 level in all models. CEOs with postgraduate education are more likely to lead firms
to conduct innovative activities. The odds ratio of CEOs with postgraduate degree is
higher than that of CEOs with undergraduate degrees in every model. The effects of
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CEO’s years of experience are statistically significant. The firm-level human capital –
ratio of engineering and technical personnel to total employees – does not have
statistically significant effect in most models.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
From the above results, my study suggests that social capital and political capital
have differential degrees of influences on firm innovativeness among China’s private
firms. Throughout all my statistical models, social capital at the firm level, with regard to
research networks, inter-firm networks, networks in the organizational field, and
professional networks, contributes to a firm’s innovation performance in a statistically
significant, positive way. However, the effects of political capital on firm innovation
performance are mixed and more complicated. I find that whereas impersonal political
capital at the firm level – the state’s assistance in terms of supportive and preferential
policies – facilitates to improve firms’ innovativeness, personal political capital may not
necessarily enhance firm innovativeness, and under some circumstances may play a
negative role in the development of firm innovativeness.
My findings support the current literature regarding social capital’s positive role
in firm performance and firm innovativeness. One of the effective ways to enhance firms’
innovation performance is to seek external resources embedded in both entrepreneurs’
and firms’ social networks. Social networks with other firms and research institutes exert
a highly significant and positive effect on firm innovativeness. Therefore, it is a wise
decision for the Chinese government to encourage firms to collaborate with universities
and research institutes. Moreover, I find that a firm’s location within an IP, SP or EPZ
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can significantly improve a firm’s innovation performance. On one hand, the geographic
proximity can reduce the transportation costs and provides adjacent firms with
opportunities to share advanced knowledge and/technology and collaborate on complex
projects. On the other hand, the Chinese government provides firms located in these areas
with preferential policies and treatment to attract technology-savvy projects and firms.
The cluster policies may also generate an innovative environment within an IP, SP or
EPZ, and thus cooperate and/or compete with each other to generate more innovative
products. Therefore, for firms that intend to improve firms’ innovative ability, it is
beneficial for them to locate or relocate in an IP, SP or EPZ. This phenomenon in China
coincides with many other developed and developed countries, such as Silicon Valley in
the United States. The geographic agglomeration of technology-savvy firms can not only
attract innovative scientists, researchers and other technical employees, but also attract
other firms with advanced technology to relocate as well as financial investments.
Furthermore, the professional networks with business associations may have a positive
influence when entrepreneurs consider promoting firm innovativeness. It is good to see
the positive role of being a member within a business association, because business
associations in China are regarded to have little use of assisting firms to grow. As a
result, for private firms in China which expect to obtain improvements in firm innovative
abilities, it is of significant importance that they should expand and utilize various social
networks.
I find mixed findings regarding the role of political capital on firm
innovativeness. The role of Chinese government as a “strong” state has “enabling” effects
on firms’ innovation performance. An entrepreneur’s impersonal political capital – state
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assistance – plays a statistically significant, positive role in a firm’s innovation
performance. The dataset in this study allows me to examine state assistance to private
firms in terms of bank financing, locating technology license and clients. Bank financing,
as one of the most important sources of finance for private firms (Zhou 2009), is essential
for the start-up and further development of entrepreneurship, as well as the establishment
and advancement of innovation. This suggests that to enhance innovative ability, the
Chinese government needs to continue the investment in terms of bank financing, helping
private firms locate technology license and clients. Supportive policies to entrepreneurial
firms can help them with the innovative and overall performance.
However, I find that an entrepreneur’s personal political capital has
“constraining” or no effects on a firm’s innovation performance. Among three indicators
for measuring an entrepreneur’s personal political capital, I find that an entrepreneur’s
Party membership plays a negative role in affecting a firm’s innovation performance, and
such an effect is statistically significant (see Models 4 and 6). As for the other two
indicators for measuring an entrepreneur’s personal political capital – whether the CEO
was a former government official or was appointed by the government, their effects on
firm innovation performance are negative but not statistically supported. A former
position in the government or appointment by the government to some extent reflects an
entrepreneur’s political connections with government officials and the government. Here
I put forward some possible explanations of why an entrepreneur’s personal political
capital may have negative or no effect on firm innovativeness. First, entrepreneurs may
build political connections with the “wrong” person. On one hand, a common Party
member has little actual political power (Wu 2006). As the lower level of Party members

44

have long lost its Party routines, organizational meetings and so on, they have probably
lost effective communication channels with those who do hold political power and
positional resources (Jiang 1997). On the other hand, a firm can benefit little from
connections with a government official who holds little decision-making power. Second,
excessive investments in political capital may bring about negative influences on firm
activities. The effective and continuous connections with higher level of Party members
and government officials may require entrepreneurs to invest a great amount of time and
energy to political networking, thus distracting entrepreneurs from concentration on the
core business activities and firm competiveness. Further, political networking with Party
members and government officials in China may involve private financial investments,
which may be illegal in some cases, such as bribes. Such financial investments may not
necessarily provide the firms with economic returns or preferential treatment. Therefore,
high financial investments in political networking with Party members and government
officials and low economic returns or preferential treatments to the firms may exert
negative consequences on firm performance and innovative activities. Third, political
investment in connections with Party members and government officials may lead to
organizational inertia in a firm. Entrepreneurs may expect to gain special treatment from
Party members and government officials through building political connections with
them, and feel less pressured to implement organizational changes and technological
upgrading. However, such expectation may not be able to be fulfilled in contemporary
China, especially when Chinese government has been continuously improving economic,
legal and political environment. Hence, entrepreneurs should note that although the
investment in political capital may assist firms to acquire external resources,
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entrepreneurs’ overt investment in personal political capital may become a burden to firm
innovativeness.
Overall, although I find the positive role of an entrepreneur’s impersonal political
capital on firm innovativeness, my findings suggest the inconclusive role of an
entrepreneur’s personal political capital. Contrary to some literature that supports the
positive effect of personal political capital on firm performance, I find negative or no
effect of entrepreneurs’ personal political capital on firm innovativeness. As the Chinese
market has been increasingly institutionalized, the personal political capital does not
seem to provide firms with competitive advantage in terms of innovative abilities and
economic transaction and firms are less likely to benefit from entrepreneurs’ personal
political capital. Hence, even though China is still in the process of market transitions, the
effects of personal political capital on firm innovativeness may suggest that the role of
political connections in China does not fundamentally differ from that in established
market economies (Nee and Opper 2007). That is to say, alongside the modernization and
institutionalization of China’s nascent market, China has and may continue to have
similar patterns in terms of the role of personal political capital on firm performance as
those in the established market economies.
This study has two limitations due to the dataset in my analysis. First, although
the dataset has information regarding social and political capital, the questions by WBIC
survey are mostly yes/no questions. Due to this limitation, I can only code the indicators
into dummy variables. Such measurement loses information that is needed in the
investigation of other quantitative aspects of social and political capital, such as network
size, tie strength, centrality and structure holes. Second, the questions asked by WBIC

46

survey are only about the formal ties with universities, research institutes, firms,
governments, and government agents. Although formal ties are one of the significant
indicators of social and political capital, a sociological perspective regarding social and
political capital weighs heavier on informal ties and/or connection rather than formal ties.
A great number of information flow, knowledge transfer, technology cooperation and/or
collaboration are fulfilled and implemented through informal alliances that connect firms
with other agents and/or organizations. For example, an entrepreneur may probably seal a
business deal or conduct rent-seeking activities through informal ties and activities, such
as a family reunion or a dinner with friends. In future research, it is worthwhile to
investigate different dimensions of social capital and political capital, and to what extent
social and political capital will have an effect on firm innovativeness.
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